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Abstract 
 
 
A complex relationship exists among EU  regulations, current national  practices and rules, 
institutional capacities to implement regulatory  adjustments and the legacy of past health and 
regulatory policy and  traditions. However, there is little empirical information on medical  devices 
policy, the medical devices industry, and the assurance of medical  device safety and usage. Drawing 
on a review of the secondary literature and on-going field work, the evidence suggests that  the current 
mix of state-centric and self-regulatory traditions will be as important in determining the 
implementation and final outcomes of EU-rules as the new  rules themselves. EU directives redesign 
rules, but they do not necessarily  lead to institutional change, create institutional capacities, or alter 
old  practices in the  short term. Neither EU directives nor national regulatory  adjustments  determine 
the "man-machine/skills-experience" interface which is shaped and influenced by local medical 
traditions and the acceptance of  these traditions by local publics. 
 
Key words: health care technologies and medical supplies industry; EU  regulation; national and 
subnational implementation; stakeholders;   convergence of a fiscal crisis; divergence of regulatory 
practices and cost  containment tools. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
  
 
Since the early 1980s, the Commission and the European industry have argued  that the 
competitiveness of the European medical devices sector is severely  constrained by three major non-
tariff barriers: (a) national health  care  policies, (b) national provisions on refunds for care, and (c) the 
limitations of small national markets (Commission 1992). EU institutions, and particularly the 
Commission, intend to liberalize markets and strengthen the competitiveness of European  industry 
world-wide. However, if the Commission is serious in scaling back  all non-tariff barriers, including 
those existing under national health  protection schemes, it faces the immense task of reversing a 
historical trend  towards an interventionist state in health care systems in Europe which has benefited 
the industry. Despite comprehensive regulatory controls of the delivery of health services, or more 
likely because of them, the European industry has maintained a symbiotic  relationship with health care 
systems and protection schemes for the last two  decades  and has been one of only a few growth 
industries.  
    On January 1, 1995, a new set of European rules covering  practically all  non-pharmaceutical 
products, except implants and  in-vitro diagnostics  (clinical chemistry diagnostics) became effective in 
all member states of the  European Union. While serving as umbrella  directive for all medical devices, 
the medical devices directive (MDD) follows the new Union law on active  medical  implantables 
(AIMDD) in effect since January 1, 1993 in the member states. The two directives cover  about 80 
percent of all medical devices used in the EU and the countries of the  European Economic Area. A 
"Draft  Proposal for a Council directive on  In-Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices of April 1993 
(IVDMDD)" finally led to the adoption of a common position of the EU Council in April 1995 and is expected to be legislated on by the end of 1995 and come into effect in the member states by January 
1998. At that time  all technical standards are expected to be available and all directives transposed 
into national law in each member state.  
   Building on the European Union's new and global approach (Commission 1994) these three 
medical devices-specific directives aim to establish a  unified statutory, regulatory and administrative 
framework for the first time in Western Europe. Regulatory policy  as policy in general is best 
understood to mean what is actually done rather than what European and national policy actors claim 
will be done and what the law prescribes to be done. National actions presuppose the existence of 
control, enforcement and accountability  structures, institutional capacities to carry them out, and  an 
on-going flow of information and communication across a variety of public and private implementors 
in the national and subnational arena.  
  The implementation of these three directives is overlaid by the "acquis  communeautaire" and the 
"acquis  judiciel" (that is, current EU laws and  court rulings). Sales and  purchases of high-tech 
installations and  equipment to hospitals (mostly public hospitals) are covered by the directive on  
public procurement. Other pertinent EU rules come into play in the implementation of EU-regulatory 
policy and include information  procedures on the  standardization of industrial production and  
products, the general product safety (GPS) directive, the low voltage  directive, the machinery 
directive,  the electro-magnetic compatibility directive, the directive on liability for defective products, 
product safety, the telecommunications terminal equipment directive and many others. Finally, there is 
the extensive legislation issued in the context of the creation of the single European  market.  
  Although the MDD provides many detailed definitions in both the texts and the appendices, it is a 
complex matter to determine what a medical device is. The term medical device stands for a broad 
range of sophisticated health technology products, equipment and installations, surgical, medical and 
dental instruments and supplies used in patient care, patient-supporting appliances and aids. In-vitro 
diagnostic medical devices include reagents, technical instruments and diagnostic  systems (combining 
both reagents and  technical instruments). A few definitions remain highly controversial and contested. 
For example, the  drug/device borderline issue remains a major bone of contention in an eight billion  
US dollar market of fictitious drugs and wound care. Issues surrounding human and animal tissues, 
confidentiality, labelling, custom-made or intermediate products, quality systems, risk analysis, 
subcontracting, technical files as well as medical waste and the eco-label are not any easier. An army 
of legal advisors, highly paid consultants, and many focus groups of European trade associations as 
well as judges are kept busy in Brussels and the member states giving legal and practical advice while 
continuing to develop workable definitions and solutions within the framework of the directives. 
  With increasing information technology in medical practice and clinical  research, definitional 
issues are not getting any easier.  Telemedicine is  widely practiced in health care systems. A medical 
device can combine  hardware and software that allow the connection of the device to any other 
computer or device via the public telecommunications network. If this is the case, the device is subject 
to the telecommunications terminal equipment directive (TTE). In other cases when software is 
installed, the information technology equipment directive (ITE) applies. 
  It will be argued that, even with unified European rules,  national and  above all subnational 
implementors have ample room to make strategic choices  and to change or refuse to change their 
established routines. Redesigning rules is not synonymous with redesigning institutions, or creating  
institutional capacities. Rules do not necessarily change institutionalized  behavior and action ((March 
and Olsen 1989) nor engrained organizational cultures. While those wishing access to European and 
global markets in order to sell their products and increase  market shares are likely to adjust fast to the  
new circumstances, those who are  responsible for enforcing compliance with  post-market controls, 
the recall of deficient products and medical vigilance are probably slower to depart from past practices. 
This argument is further strengthened by the existence of significant  policy connections between 
medical devices, the delivery of health care, the coverage of benefits and the reimbursement of 
providers for the use of medical devices in patient care  by national health protection schemes. Medical 
devices are part of the globalization of production  and technology. Yet their local use in patient care 
transcends the confines  of production, R&D and sales and  reaches deep into intra-health care  affairs.  
  In an article of this length, it is not possible to follow up on every  political development in Europe 
or individual countries which may be related to medical devices. Nor is it possible to confirm the 
second-thoughts which a few  policymakers have voiced in the post-Maastricht era about the detailed 
and legally binding annexes which have had a few unintended regulatory rather than  deregulatory effects. The paper is limited to a discussion of the implementation of the medical  devices-specific EU-
directives and other EU-directives bearing on industrial products. It contrasts and compares the 
pharmaceutical and the medical devices industry. It reviews the regulatory practices in  health care in 
Western European countries, provides an inventory of current distribution and  purchasing practices, 
and identifies the major stakeholders  in medical  devices-related decisionmaking processes: 
governmental offices,  suppliers, wholesalers, distributors, and doctors and hospitals. Finally, it  
concludes by drawing out a few lessons from the available information and  suggests several research 
tracks for further study. If at this stage it is impossible to have all the empirical facts at hand, drawing 
on rich interdisciplinary literature (law, political science and  public administration) and field work is 
justified as a necessary first  step. In a second phase the formal, but above all, informal  patterns of 
interaction  between sellers, purchasers and users and their politics will be mapped and examined. 
 
 
2. Approach 
 
 
In elaborating about the implementation of EU directives in the EC member  states and signatories of 
the European Economic Area this article integrates insights from two levels of implementation analysis: 
a (a) "top-down"  approach on the national transposition of EU rules through national legislation; and 
(b) a "bottom up" perspective of implementation and company- and other organization-based 
implementation efforts which include  purchasers, notifying bodies, monitoring organizations, 
distributors, retailers and sales  representatives. In theory, the transposed national laws and ordinances 
provide the necessary prescriptions for implementation. In  reality, implementation processes span 
several tiers of reality: macro-policy and structural; numerous policy linkages between the medical 
devices policy  domain, the policy domain of national protection schemes and the industrial  sector at 
the meso-level; and policy effects at care- sites: hospitals, nursing homes, doctors' offices and homes.  
  From a "top down view" the transposition of the two EU-directives into  national law is almost 
complete. The AIMD is transposed in fifteen countries  and the MDD in ten countries, while the 
AIMD is pending in one country and  the MDD in seven countries (EUCOMED 1994-1995). Having 
completed to designate the competent authorities a few countries have reorganized the relevant 
organizational unit within the ministry of health. A few have organized authority and operational 
responsibilities for medical devices regulation out of the Ministry of Health and delegated them to 
seemingly independent organizations. Some have split the authority and  operational responsibilities 
for adverse event reporting and clinical notification and others have not. In some instances, the 
authority  and responsibilities for all functions rests under the same organizational roof. Brussels has 
been informed about the identity of notified bodies, their expertise and qualifications for all or a few 
modules only. Notified bodies are highly competitive and their promises in glittery advertisements are 
impressive.  
  With the laws and regulations in place and authority and  operational responsibilities assigned, one 
should now expect faithful implementation. However, such view is simplistic because implementation 
is never a self-executing process. Actions need to be taken and decisions made, and legal, 
administrative, medical, ethical and/or social conflicts solved when and wherever these  arise. Central 
decisionmakers frequently overrate their capacity to control implementation, steer the flow of 
information and communication, and  often underrate the existence of problems on the ground. 
Implementation processes should therefore never be understood as automatic, linear and  uniform.  
  From a "bottom up" perspective, implementation is far more complex. Beyond transposition, the 
implementation of EU regulation is mediated by  public and private sector corporate actors dealing 
with medical devices  and/or national protection schemes. They take action, make  decisions and solve 
conflicts and in so doing can use multiple 'access', 'veto' and 'decision' points to their advantage when 
adjusting past practices to new EU-rules. A good many actions and decisions are contingent upon  
current national rules, administrative practices and the delivery, the  financing and the reimbursement 
of health care in each country. 
  These legacies of financing, delivering and reimbursing for patient care and health governance, 
public administration and law are strong. Payers of health care, health  workers, clinicians and those 
who monitor clinical investigations and  adverse event reporting are influential intermediaries. Finally, sellers,  distributors and corporate sales representatives and the purchasers of  medical devices form 
another cast of characters.  
  On the industry-side, the three  medical devices-specific directives roughly correspond to three 
distinct industrial sectors: high-technological equipment  and medical supplies, clinical chemistry 
diagnostics, and the electromedical  diagnostic  sector. Each has discrete attributes related to the nature 
and  size of the industry, company structure, market shares, established   distribution and sales 
practices, and volume, price and degree of risk of the  products they sell or distribute. The directives 
cover premarket, market, and post sales-related  processes: innovation and R&D in companies and 
laboratories, clinical trials, manufacture, sales, distribution, wholesaling and retailing and purchasing. 
The use and safety of medical devices  fall primarily into the realm of health care delivery, with 
surveillance and  medical vigilance cutting across  health care and enforcement.  
  While an analysis of the political economy of each industrial sector is beyond the scope of this 
paper, a few observations can be made. The medical devices industry is a huge global market. In 
1990/1991 the  industry manufactured goods worth over $ 450 billion  (Mathews 1993). The  United 
States, the world's largest producer, accounts for 58 percent of  world-wide production. Europe is the 
second largest  producer, accounting for  33 percent, Japan is third with 8 percent. A similar pattern 
holds for the  consumption and use of medical devices, with the  United States consuming 50  percent 
of world-production, Europe 33 percent and Japan  13 percent. About a third of all biomaterials 
production in health  technologies worldwide are  manufactured by ten transnational companies 
(Willems et al. 1992:8).  
  In Europe, Germany is the largest market for medical equipment and  supplies, with  about 30 
percent of the market.  France accounts for  15 percent, the United  Kingdom 12 percent and Italy 12 
percent. Spain is the fifth largest  market  at 6 percent, followed by The Netherlands at 5 percent. The 
remaining EU and EFTA countries oscillate between 3.5 percent and 1 percent (Mathews 1993). 
  In 1993 the IVD market was a 4.6 billion ECU volume (invoice  sales, EDMA) Germany had the 
largest market, with 27 percent. France and Italy  account for 20 percent, Spain for 12 percent and the 
United Kingdom for 5 percent.  
  Until January 1, 1995, the intensity and density of regulation in European countries have varied 
considerably, and not every country has regulated each area.  There have been different practices for 
securing the (a) the safety, quality and  performance of medical  devices; (b) product registration 
requirements; (c)  inspection  practices; (d) pre-market testing and certification (type-testing  or type 
approval which is either compulsory prior to marketing or quasi-compulsory in view of connections 
with national health care delivery schemes); (e) post-sales controls and practices for servicing and 
maintenance; (f) medical vigilance and quality assurance; and, last but not least  (g) vastly different  
patterns of participating actors from the  medical devices  policy domain, the medical industrial sector, 
the health  protection schemes and the health care delivery systems. These actors have  different 
authority and influence, pursue  different interests and goals, and have different motivations and  
preferences which shape or constrain their game plans in response to new EU rules (Scharpf 1989; 
Ashford 1993:317-362).  
  The "quality instruments" of the new and global approach  pursued by EU institutions and in 
particular the Commission include: essential safety  requirements for different product groups. 
Certification of conformity of  products with the essential requirements presupposes compliance with  
international or European standards specified for different product groups  and risk  classes. 
Compliance with the relevant CEN/CENELEC standards implies fulfillment of the essential 
requirements of the directive, and is a  precondition for certification of conformity assessment 
procedures.  
  Medical devices are classified under four classes of risk: low (class I) intermediate (class IIa and 
IIB) and high (class III). High risk products are subject to more intensive verification procedures 
(including third party  testing) than low-risk products. Both these risk categories and the  specification 
of general and essential requirements continue to be controversial. Assessments of risk and risk-taking 
are highly subjective issues, and manufacturers, regulators, standardizers, and end users have different 
perceptions and tolerance for taking risks. 
  Two major types of uncertainty in the use of medical  devices are in particular troubling: risks 
associated with the devices themselves (arising from the  "man-machine" interface) and uncertainties 
of a general medical  and professional nature  (arising from a man-machine/skills-experience interface). 
Limited  skills and lack of experience with medical devices are one cause of risks to patients and  users. Devices can pose risks to patients when they are diffused too early, when they are too old (eg x-ray  
equipment), when they are based on non-biocompatable and non-sterilized  materials, when they are 
not serviced, and when they are over-or underpowered. Inadequate staffing, incorrect handling, and the 
lack of appropriate labels or instructions can also lead  to hazards or misuse. While high standards for 
safety and quality, reliability of performance and minimization of risks are in the interests of all 
patients and users, critics argue that the EU-directives do  not go far enough and leave too many issues 
unaddressed and unresolved. 
  Standardization and standards are the key to European regulation. Due to limitations of space, it is 
only possible to indicate briefly  what is at stake. The strategy pursued by the Commission in the 1990s  
stresses standards for a broad group or family  of products (horizontal) on  labelling, symbols, 
biocompatibility,  electromagnetic compatibility,  sterility, good manufacturing practices  (GMP), good 
diagnostic practices  (GDP) and guides for clinical  evaluation. Product-specific standards  (vertical) 
were emphasized  during the 1970 and 1980s, but by the early 1980s they were seen as  inhibiting 
innovation, competitiveness and economic  growth. Now they  are to be used sparingly, but most 
standards for high-tech  medical  devices continue to be product-specific (eg MRI).  
  CEN, the European standardization body, is currently working on a  workplan comprising about 
140  European standards. Some 100 standards were  mandated under the MDD and 40 by the AIMDD. 
Because of the wide variety of  MD products, the CEN Technical Sector Board (BTS) 3 "Healthcare" 
has adopted a three-level approach under the MDD. Level I standards are basic standards, i.e. 
standards covering fundamental requirements common to all or to a very wide range of medical 
devices; Level II standards relate to group  standards, i.e. standards relating to requirements common 
to a group or  family of medical devices; Level III Product standards, i.e. standards  relating to a  
particular type of medical device (Moore 1994).  
  The manufacture  of high-tech installation, equipment and other  electromedical products  requires 
different technologies and component parts. In a global  market, high technology components are 
frequently manufactured in one country and assembled with lower tech components manufactured in 
another country. This is of central concern to those concerned with product liability issues (Orgalime 
1993) who prefer product- and part-specific standards for medical devices, although EU regulation 
makes standards and  standardization  voluntary. The additional uncertainty surrounding  risk-levels 
for medical  devices, as distinct from general medical uncertainty, blurs the lines  between the de jure 
and de facto obligations of medical devices  manufacturers, providers and other parties involved in 
patient care. 
  Standards are typically viewed as a technical, chemical and  engineering matter. Yet they raise 
complicated economic, political and  scientific  and, in the case of medicine, cultural issues (David 
1987;  Schneider and Werle 1990, 1991; Schmidt and Werle 1992, 1993; Olshan 1993). Medicine 
raises cultural issues because medical technology is  fundamentally  cultural and contingent upon local 
medical school traditions (McPherson  1990; Kaufer 1992), providers' tastes and preferences, and 
social acceptance  of these preferences.  Yet, in an  increasingly interdependent world, economic, 
political  and scientific conflicts over quality and safety standards are likely  to increase in importance. 
The crucial issue is whose standards and  conceptual frameworks will guide the regulation of 
production sites and  product standards and the distribution, sale, and purchase of medical  devices in 
the 21st century.  
 
3. The medical devices and pharmaceutical industry compared 
 
 
Non-tariff-barriers for the medical devices industry are said to be as extensive and numerous as they 
are for the pharmaceutical industry. However, in contrast to a 25-year practice of regulating the 
pharmaceutical sector (Burstall 1991; Touche Ross 1991, Greenwood and Ronit 1991; Anderson 1994), 
the  medical devices sector has not attracted the attention of European and national regulators until 
very recently. A certain view persist in some quarters as if medical devices and pharmaceuticals and 
the respective industries were similar. But extrapolating from the experience of the pharmaceutical 
industry with European regulation is risky for several reasons. First, the sector-specific directives for 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices do not  share the same internal architecture, with their formats 
and approaches differing considerably. Second, the two industrial sectors are not identical, with 
important differences in company structures, distribution, wholesale and retail practices, and targeted end users.  While the pharmaceutical industry is fairly homogeneous, the medical devices industry  is 
very heterogenous, although about a third of all medical devices are  manufactured by about ten 
transnational companies which are not identical  with the leading global players in pharmaceuticals. In 
some instances the  boundaries between pharmaceutical companies and medical devices companies are 
actually blurred because some pharmaceutical companies have gone into lucrative medical devices 
production. Yet, in contrast to a few  American companies which have gone this route, European 
transnationals are medical devices companies  sui generis. In Europe, there are also many highly 
specialized medium and small  enterprises (SMEs). Further, these two industries have organized their  
representation in Brussels and lobby on their own behalf in the countries' capitols and Brussels 
(Altenstetter  1994). 
  In light of these political and structural differences, the interaction  between governments and 
export-dependent industries and individual companies is unlikely to play out in similar ways across the 
two industrial sectors at all levels of decision making  on policy and rules: national, European, and 
international. The goals and interests of manufacturers of active implantables, highly sophisticated 
health care technologies and clinical chemistry, to name a few, are not identical. Some produce single, 
highly expensive items and others  high volume, low  cost items  while serving different clienteles at 
the same time. Finally, and most importantly, national health care policy, macroallocation decisions on 
resources and cost containment policies have affected the two industries in  different ways. For some 
time now, pharmaceuticals have been at center stage in cost containment efforts. Medical devices are 
not yet drawn into a thicket  of regulation, although capacity and location planning has limited the 
diffusion of expensive technologies. A major controversy persists about the extent to which medical 
devices come under the reach of pharmaceutical regulation. The persistence of this view is reflected in 
the ways in which a few countries have organized authority and responsibility  for medical vigilance 
and post-sales monitoring. 
 
 
4. Regulatory practices in health care in context 
 
 
Historically, industrialized nations have employed a mix of six major methods of regulation: 
nationalization, hybridization, administrative regulation, public agency regulation (preferred in the 
USA), self-regulation and regulation within firms and groups (Wright 1993). With the exception of  
public agency regulation, all other forms of regulation are found in Europe's health  care systems, with 
distinct  "regulatory and administrative cultures" and recently,  "management cultures." These health 
care systems are also embedded in societies with different notions of the polity, the state, common law 
and Roman law (Dyson 1980; Bogason 1991, Majone 1994; Metcalf and Richards 1993). Even 
different "safety and quality philosophies" have been  identified across the  EU countries relating to 
occupational health and  safety regulation (Eichener 1993; Joerges 1988, 1992) and  environmental 
regulation (Vogel 1986).  
  In the European tradition regulations and governmental rules have  primarily been about social 
goals rather than efficiency, including securing  health as a social  good rather than as a commodity, 
imposing controls in the public interest, and conflict management. Only secondarily are they about  
efficiency. The understanding of "effective governmental rules" by economists squarely contrast with 
rule-making and rule-adjudicating which invoke values, politics, conflict resolution and law. 
  The last decade has seen changes in the nature of the state which has been "hollowed out" at three 
distinct levels, with some variations across  countries (Peters 1993). These changes include a loss of 
legitimacy at the macro-level,  decentralizing program delivery at the meso-level, and a  diminished 
role for officials at the community level. Health care reforms have followed similar developments. 
Reformers in, for example, the United Kingdom, Sweden and The Netherlands established  "internal 
markets" within national health  services schemes, introduced a few competitive elements in national 
health  protection schemes such as in Germany, changed the management of regional and local health  
authorities  and altered the relationship between public and private management (Jéô.-Forget et al. 
1993; Eliassen and Kooiman 1993). However, the evidence does not suggest that these reforms have 
overridden the distinct and recurring patterns of public and private sector management in Anglo-Saxon, 
in contrast to continental European, countries and replaced country-specific patterns of behavior and 
attitudes.  
4.1  Prescriptions for the delivery, financing, reimbursement, and regulation of health services 
 
One of the features of European regulatory controls over health care is that controls are applied at the 
macro-policy and sectoral levels which affect provider and user groups in uniform ways. Even the 
previously mentioned "internal markets" and "competitive elements" operate under the umbrella of 
national policies. Where the "public model" applies, state agencies at the central, regional/district, or 
local level formulate and  implement regulations and monitor compliance and  accountability. Where 
the  "self-regulatory" model is practised as in Germany and the Netherlands, corporatist or associative 
actors control  decision-making, implementation, enforcement, and  accountability, including quality 
assurance and medical audits.  
  A substantial body of literature (too numerous to be listed here) links national health policy,  
government, interest groups, and institutions and discusses the changing  role of the state as payor, 
regulator, owner and employer in several western  European countries and speak to the convergence 
which has occurred in the interaction between markets and government, church and state, industrial 
relations and ownership, entrepreneurship, sales and  commerce and the  medical profession. Yet, 
despite fairly similar  policy reactions, interventionist legislation over long periods of time and and 
continuing interaction of state regulators and provider markets have produced variations in each 
country. Even similar  responses to rising health care costs have not produced the same results (Abel-
Smith 1992). 
  The last two decades have also seen an increase of macro-controls on volume of services, prices,  
budgets and capital investments and the breadth and depth of the effects they  aimed to achieve. With 
resources for health care becoming scarcer  everywhere  and competing with other public goods, the 
volume of regulation is unlikely  to shrink. Recent cost containment policies and  strategies have added 
new layers of regulatory controls such as aggregate spending targets and caps, global budgets. These 
controls contrast with the language of  "internal markets", "competition among purchasers," 
"competitive incentives," and the like.  
  All European countries have experienced financial crises in health care spending so demand-side 
restrictions have  become more popular with European  policymakers, although they are nowhere as 
common and extensive as in the United States. In the United Kingdom, the  Netherlands, Germany, 
and Italy, costs are being  shifted to consumers  by increasing copayments through a variety of  cost-
sharing methods. National reformers are all too eager to find advocacy  coalitions to  support a 
reduction of the public share in health care  financing. Whether they privatize medical resources, 
introduce  competition inside  national health services, "manage" care or privatize  health risks  
through increased copayments and deductibles, there has not  been an escape from regulation. 
  The delivery of hospital care in practically all EU countries  rests on multi-tiered hospital-based 
service arrangements, with different providers  working in either the public or the private  hospital 
sector (Massion and Schutyster 1993; Glaser 1987). Lately,  outpatient services have been added. The 
delivery modes are negotiated and  bargained by teams representing  hospitals and the buyers of 
hospital  services. Over the last twenty years state institutions have intervened in  the supply of 
hospitals and hospital beds by guiding the geographic and  functional distribution of high-tech medical 
resources through hospital  planning and location planning (OECD 1990; 1992). 
  The delivery of hospital care is the responsibility of each  member state (or regional and 
county/local governments) and will remain so in the post-Maastricht era. Public hospitals are now 
subject to the directive on public works and the public procurement directives. With information 
technology, computers and telecommunications penetrating into doctors' offices and hospitals, the  
practice of medicine is  being  revolutionized. Telemedicine and computers and information 
technology have far-reaching implications for patient care and patient data management, hospital 
management and organization, internal quality assurance schemes, purchasing practices and many 
other intra-hospital non-medical services. They hardly make regulatory controls obsolete.         
  The last decade also has seen the development of all kinds of legislated or self-regulatory quality  
assurance schemes for the delivery of quality health care based on the  individual responsibility of the 
medical  profession (Jost 1990) and  hospitals, and include institutional review  boards (IRBs) and 
"human  subject" commissions. Quality assurance  programs are a direct result of the proliferation and  
use of new and  unproven medical technologies, the use of old and obsolete  medical devices and cost 
containment efforts.    A recently published eight country-study of health care technology assessment provides valuable 
comparative insights into macro-controls of the  pharmaceutical and the medical devices sector (Health 
Policy 1994; Banta and Luce 1993). While it fully confirms the significant differences of policy and 
implementation of pre-and  post-market controls of these two sectors in all eight countries, it also 
speaks to the different stages of development which the two industries find themselves in. But the 
study does not address the subnational implementation of public policy  and the interactions between   
purchasers and users (that is, surgeons, clinicians, health care workers or  even patients) on the one 
hand and corporate sales representatives,  distributors and retailers on the other. 
 
4.2 Medical devices regulation: from production sites to distribution,  sales and procurement.  
 
The scope and content of the regulations bearing on  medical  devices are less intensive and far-
reaching  than those for health  care delivery, finance, reimbursement, pharmaceuticals, manpower and 
services  planning. Even in the few countries which for some time have had medical  devices-specific 
rules on the books like France and Germany  (perceived to be 
"the most highly regulated country") and the United  Kingdom which enforced  regulations in the 
absence of specific legislation, the regulatory reach  was limited. The  Scandinavian countries and The 
Netherlands have been involved in medical technology assessment and monitoring of technology for 
some time. For the majority of European countries, however, building up manpower and  institutional 
capacities is now required. A few countries have regulated the  disposal of medical supplies and 
medical waste. Still fewer have enacted rules concerning in-vitro medical devices. In a five-country 
comparison of law and practice (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom)  Maassen 
(1991:2) found a high degree of inconsistency and lack of homogeneity in existing  national regulation 
of IVD-products. He writes: "At the one hand of the scale, Germany has the most comprehensive 
regulation of IVDMD, followed by France which occupies a middle ground. At the other end of the 
scale are countries with only little or practically no regulation relating directly to IVDMD: Italy, Spain 
and the United Kingdom. Legal requirements, if they exist at all, for IVDMD, which can be roughly 
divided into reagents, technical instruments and diagnostic systems (combining both reagents and 
technical instruments), relate separately to reagents on the one hand and to technical instruments on the 
other." 
 
_________________________________________________________        
Table: B 
Relative strength of state regulatory intervention, 1980 
_________________________________________________________          
4.3 Coverage for quality care and medical procedures.  
 
In most  western European countries, access to health care means entitlement to  high-tech diagnosis 
and treatment, patient-supporting devices and medical aids paid for by health protection and accident-
at-work  schemes, with various arrangements for copayments and deductibles  (BASYS 1991:79-83; 
1992a, 1992b). Public coverage for these products is limited to  about 75 percent (EC-average). In 
contrast, public coverage for high-tech treatment of inpatients or outpatients is about 97 percent 
coverage (EC average), or 90 percent in doctors' offices (J ösx1990:88). The average  percentage of  
bills paid by public insurance for hospital care and  ambulatory care is  considerably higher than for 
medical goods and patient-supporting aids.  Belgium,  the Netherlands and Spain limit eligibility for 
these items  (J ösx1990:89). In several countries refund policies for the same item (eg wheelchair) vary 
under health care protection and accident-at-work protection schemes. 
 
4.4 Spending on medical appliances and aids.  
 
Most comparative analyses neglect to examine the relative share of national health care spending on 
medical appliances and medical aids and dental services. Yet, taken together, these two areas form a 
significant component of per-capita and GDP spending  in most countries. Spending on dental services 
is close to or even higher  than spending on prescription drugs. In contrast, the percentage of GDP 
spent  on medical  goods in 1989 was modest. But most OECD member states have shared  one  
experience. From 1960 onward, public coverage against the costs of medical goods has been expanding (OECD 1990:145). Expenditures have  accelerated everywhere due to the needs of a 
growing elderly and disabled  population, low cost equipment and patient-supporting aids.  The use of 
innovative technologies in medical practice and minimally invasive surgery, improved post-operative 
care and more effective implants and prostheses and increasing consumption sooner or later will attract 
the attention of health  policymakers and cost conscious payors and buyers of health care.  
 
4.5 Controls on volume, services and medical procedures.  
 
In the past, Western European countries have engineered ways to curb demand for health  care by 
controlling the volume of services and their utilization. The first  is achieved through the selective 
exclusion of  diagnostic and therapeutic  services. For example, the British NHS limits eligibility for 
hip  replacements, renal dialysis and heart transplants by age. Most countries  have limits on physical 
therapy, and  the number of days that can be spent in  hospitalization,  rehabilitation, etc.. Open or 
covert rationing is the most  drastic form  of limiting services. If pressures on health care budgets 
continue to  rise, it will be important to examine more systematically how decisions  to exclude 
diagnostic and therapeutic medical procedures from reimbursement are made, who makes them, and 
the effects such decisions have on providers and patients.  
  A second type of control is achieved through a variety of  copayments  by consumers/patients. 
Copayments are seen as distorting  prices and  restricting markets for medical goods as well as 
inhibiting  innovation and  development. Unlimited coverage is seen as providing  incentives to 
increase  demand for medical procedures, patient-supporting appliances and  medical aids. On the 
other  hand, the inclusion of medical technologies  (procedures) in reimbursement schedules 
guarantees high turnover, sales  and profits. With an increasing use of certain medical devices, even at  
home, the issue of appropriate pricing of medical devices and  reimbursement under public programs 
may come under closer scrutiny  everywhere. Charges of overpricing are sometimes  heard, including  
exaggerated fees for leasing equipment like oxygen machines  at home. Differences in payment 
methods between accident-at-work schemes and health protection schemes eventually may be evened 
out. 
  Four types of copayments are paid for medical appliances,  patient supports and aids (MPS 
1990):25,35-37,43-47). The most  prevalent method is a  percentage payment, which is used in nine  
countries. The remaining countries use fixed amounts. The exclusion of  diagnostic and therapeutic 
procedures is  practised in five countries (Belgium, Italy, NL, Germany and Ireland). The  following 
therapies or products are excluded from health protection schemes: Kuren (Belgium), contact lenses, 
contact lens cleaner (all in Germany), prosthetics, orthopaedic shoes, hearing aids and eyeglasses (Italy, 
Netherlands),  and baths and massages (Netherlands). Finally, three countries (Belgium, Ireland and 
United Kingdom) use some fixed copayment  for  specific products (eye frames, prosthetics, hearing 
aids. 
 
4.6 The cost of administering legislation and the regulation of  medical  devices.  
 
Information on spending for high-tech equipment,  medical  
supplies,  medical aids and patient-supporting devices is quite limited. Record-keeping  remains a 
function of the respective health  care system and reflects its  particular division of labor between the  
hospital and non-hospital sector, the range of combinations of public-private delivery systems, 
reimbursement methods, etc.. As a result,  administrative accounting has a long way to go  before 
systematic data are available for comparisons (Poullier 1992).  Poullier argues that  administrative 
costs for health care are higher than  typically recorded  in most OECD countries. This argument is 
persuasive. The  private sector  shoulders the bulk of the cost of administering pre-market  controls, 
including standardization, and post-sales controls which do not  show up  in national accounts. Costs 
for capital equipment, machinery, maintenance etc. seem to be "hidden" in global budgets, accounting 
arrangements and national accounts for public administration. 
  
 
5. Missing information about selling, purchasing, distribution and  retailing practices 
 
 Two pressures are simultaneously at work in the implementation of EU-regulations: globalization of 
production and technology and national cost containment policies. This section presents a profile of the 
major stakeholders leaving an in-depth analysis of resolution of these dual pressures for later field 
work.  
 
5.1 Purchasers.  
 
Independent practitioners of office-medicine usually  seem to purchase their medical supplies and 
equipment directly from   distributors and/or networks of corporate sales representatives. Companies 
do  engage in so-called 'ethical marketing' and follow some codes of conduct. But  the conditions  
under which distributors and/or corporate sales representatives advertise and sell  their products to 
doctors, laboratories  and hospitals are not well documented. Some companies are known to use  
networks of salespersons with excellent contacts to medical specialists and hospitals. Building on these 
contacts they do not need to advertise their products.  Recently, the international and national press and 
the payers of health care have spoken of bribes, corruption and scandals in several European countries. 
The companies keep silent about sales strategies and data on sales, profits, innovation and  
development nor do they reveal reliable data on R & D on medical devices. (Statistisches Bundesamt 
1992:65-66). 
  Another group of purchasers, far more important in  terms of the value of sales, turnover, and use, 
are public and private  hospitals, other health  care facilities, clinics, rehabilitation facilities and 
residential homes.  Often, installations and equipment are not purchased by the individual  facility  but 
by a variety of non-medical procurement officers and government offices (OECD 1991:87). Categories 
of buyer groups include: 
 
Physicians: GPs, specialists and subspecialists 
Mixes of public, not-for-profit community hospitals, and for-profit clinics  
Central university hospitals 
Regional medical schools 
Municipal hospitals 
Small- and medium-sized hospitals 
Acute and long-term hospitals for the chronically sick and disabled. 
 
In the past, each country applied its own sets of rules, norms and  procedures to guide decision makers 
on procurement, purchases, tendering, the development and monitoring of performance and descriptive 
standards.  
 
5.2 Decision makers on procurement. 
 
Recent health reforms have altered procurement practices in national health systems and in particular 
in the British  National Health Service. The EU directive on procurement requires new  methods of 
purchasing and procedures which will have to be adjusted by a variety  of responsible offices and 
bodies who in the past were responsible to decide on procurements. Based on information in trade 
journals and intelligence reports procurement decisions were made by: 
   *  central authority(ies); 
  *  regional health boards, Lä=â, county         councils; 
 *  local  governments; 
  *  individual hospitals and hospital boards; 
  *  individual physicians and specialists; 
  *  purchasing agencies buy directly; 
  *  a central purchasing board handles purchases       for 
    all/some  hospitals; 
   *      a central authority approves  the        preselection  of 
equipment and medical         devices and a hospital equipment boards of  
    area health boards implement the purchases.  
  *  most purchases need to be authorized because     the majority of equipment is paid through         government 
grants. 
 
Depending on the value of the  equipment, the location in old or new hospitals, and the ownership: 
public or  private hospitals, the procedures to follow differed. 
 
Tendering was handled as  
 
* open tendering published in the official journal; 
* closed tendering with control of state agency; 
* selective tendering (registered suppliers are invited to       bid);  
* annual or bi-annual supply contracts on the basis           of recommendations 
that products be bought only from  registered manufacturers; 
* "hidden" "buy local" procurement policies. 
  
Requirements for performance and descriptive standards needed to follow these procedures:  
 
* medical equipment must conform to national standards    which follow European (EN) and 
international standards (ISO and IEC); 
* electro-medical equipment must be approved by a national certifying body;  
* equipment must be tested prior to approval by a central authority; 
* electric appliances must be registered with a national board; 
* certain medical products must be approved by the Ministry of Health; 
* national standards are issued for certain products for use on patients (e.g. surgical implants, renal  
  equipment, catheters and infusion products); 
* products must be registered with a national authority prior to introduction onto the market; 
* products must be registered with a national authority prior to import: 
* safety tests must be implemented prior to introduction onto the market; 
* special safety standards for handicapped aids; 
* limited approval of operating high-technology equipment with  periodic renewal. 
 
While a few practices and procedures have been or, will have to be, adjusted at the highest policy level 
through legislation (eg the transposition of the annexes and the modules), subnational implementors 
will be asked to make many other changes.   
 
5.3 Suppliers, retailers and distributors  
 
Suppliers, retailers and distributors are important  intermediaries between the industry and the buyers. 
But little systematic work is  available about them. Since January 1, 1995, they can only sell and  
distribute products which  meet the essential requirements of European rules and meet international or 
European standards to secure safety in all care settings. Full implementation of these directives also  
requires changes in the handling, storage and transportation of medical devices. As previously 
mentioned, high tech equipment and medical  supplies are purchased in a variety of ways, but little is 
known about the ways in which decisions on purchasing medical devices are made and about corporate 
sales strategies and  existing wholesale and retailing practices, except for insiders. Partial evidence 
suggests the existence of important differences between countries which pay different prices for the 
same products. There are differences between individual companies in their sales strategies and 
interactions  with clinical specialists and  surgeons. The major groups of buyers, decision makers and 
distributors are identified below. These are 
 
* approved national suppliers;  
* importer/distributor: general/specialised and small/large; 
* individual agents;  
* exclusive agent to cover the whole country; 
* local distributors engaged in re-exporting 
* activities; * local manufacturing and sales of subsidiaries of   multinationals;  
* sales subsidiary of domestic manufacturers; 
* foreign sales subsidiaries; 
* collaboration with local manufacturers making non-conflicting products. 
 
Case studies could yield insights into the  politics of sellers and purchasers when contracting and 
subcontracting. But they are not available. 
 
 
6. Implications for research and concluding comments 
 
 
This paper grew out of an interest in understanding the extent to   which the new EU-rules  on medical 
devices are implemented in the member states and what regulatory adjustments are made in highly 
regulated and complex health care systems in western European nations. Since January 1, 1995, two 
out of three directives are now in force, signalling the beginning of a new era in medical devices 
regulation for the industry and manufacturers, health  care providers, patients, payors and purchasers of 
health care. Whether the Commission softens its views on the negative effects which national  controls 
on pricing, fixing fees, restricting the volume  and consumption of services have on technological 
innovation, discovery and the  competitiveness of European industries, is  uncertain at this time. 
  Changes in copayments or deductibles for medical care commodities, the exclusion of medical 
procedures, the introduction of "internal markets",  competitive  elements in health protection schemes 
and the further privatization of health risks require a good many new regulations. While cost 
containment strategies may constitute major barriers to free trade of sophisticated technology and  
medical supplies in  the European Union, these are in the interest of governments and all domestic  
payors of health care: tax payers,  contributors to public or private  insurance and consumers. It is in 
everyone's interest to continue to  stabilize domestic health care expenditures.  From this perspective, 
the idea  of abolishing non-tariff  barriers and leaving a resolution on prices, fees,  volumes and 
services  to market forces seems impossibly ambitious. Yet the  political rhetoric about market forces 
is appealing but also highly  misleading. 
  Unless European countries are willing to pay more than 25 percent of every dollar for 
administrative costs compared to the current range of between 6 and 10 percent, and 14 percent of 
GDP for health care rather than the current range of between 5 and 8 percent, lifting these controls on 
prices, fees, volumes, services, the distribution of expensive technologies in the office- and the 
hospital-sector and geographic and functional capacity planning would be foolish and 
counterproductive. The fiscal crisis, widely  debated and  documented, doubtless points toward 
convergence. Yet, past regulatory  practices in health care and preliminary findings of medical devices  
regulation point to considerable divergence in pre-market, market and  post-market controls. If 
European societies start with substantial variations in rules and practices concerning the use of medical 
devices, rather than their manufacture, convergence is unlikely to be achieved soon. 
   Mutual recognition, home country  controls and standards development reveal traces of these 
distinct "regulatory, administrative and management cultures" in the handling of pre-market controls 
and  post-sales monitoring. The centrality of state-centric and self-regulatory   traditions in health care  
is difficult to undermine, although health care  systems are undergoing substantial reforms while the 
role of the state in  health care is also being redefined. In the presence of strong policy legacies in all 
aspects of health care the relationship between EU regulation,  current national practices and rules, 
unequal political and administrative  capacities to deliver national legislation and implement regulatory 
adjustments make it unlikely that while accounting for comparable cases EU regulation will produce 
the same outcomes. 
  Whether uniform  European rules will bring all manufacturers the savings expected from  
harmonized Europe-wide rules is also unclear. Some manufacturers in  highly specialized  and local 
markets who intend to go global or Europe-wide  first will  have to  bear additional costs.  Those 
who expect that a unified  statutory, regulatory and administrative framework will produce the desired  
effects seem to overlook what Foote (1992: 216) so dramatically pointed out  as  hindering innovation 
and development of medical devices in the United States. She writes: "The manner in which the 
policies are crafted and implemented leads to effects on the device industry. These effects may  be further influenced by the interactions of various policy  prescriptions." While she is on target in 
suggesting that inconsistent and incoherent policy prescriptions produce  adverse effects  and often 
undesired outcomes, the implication that the logic of universal access to high tech medical procedures 
in patient care is irreconcilable with the logic of cost containment and the logic of industrial policy is 
fundamentally challenged. Despite an array of regulatory controls on  price, volume, budget and 
investment in Europe over the last twenty years, the medical devices industry has been one of few  
growth industries in Europe and globally.  
  Dramatic developments are taking place in health technologies  industries and delivery systems 
everywhere. Industry- and medical  profession-driven developments are revolutionizing the delivery of 
health  care. Global markets for innovative and complex medical technologies are  emerging for the 
first time on an unprecedented scale. Computer and  information technology are  adding new speed to 
the transformations under way  in patient care,  billing, accounting and research. Some research and 
expert communities, buyers of health care and state administrations are riding high  on the information 
highway and in cyberspace. 
  The key issue for the future is how the tensions between liberalized  markets and globalized 
production and technology will be resolved while retaining or securing  universal health care as a 
social good at the same time. The answers depend on whose value premises win out in global high 
technology competition,  and how the pressures for local cost  containment are reconciled with the 
globalization of healthcare production and technologies and the liberalization of trade. Much will also  
depend on how different nations balance the needs of patients/consumers and  users for high safety and 
quality  requirements against the needs of  export-dependent industries. To resolve the competing 
claims  of competitive organized economic and political interests is a  highly conflictual political 
process.  
  Short of systematic research beyond the rhetorical and symbolic aspects of regulatory policy, there 
is no simple way of knowing exactly what actually happens on the ground. Research needs to  be 
pursued along several tracks. It must clarify the role and impact which  past approaches in the EU 
member states have had on recent choices and reorganizations in order to implement the EU-directives.  
Research ought to look into what  the notified bodies, those who certify conformity with EU 
regulations, and  those who monitor MD-, IVD- and AIMD-products are actually doing, and examine 
whether they have changed routines in reality rather than on paper only. Research  needs to clarify the 
politics surrounding the choices by national regulators in designating testing  houses, and how these 
choices may influence the  decisions of  manufacturers to submit requests for conformity assessments 
and CE marking (conformit éeuropéó>) in one western European country rather than another. Research 
should monitor the progress made in reducing the "windows of uncertainty" arising from the use of 
medical devices, and  how  and whether the new European-wide information exchange networks and 
medical  vigilance system work, and  what regulatory data, if any, are exchanged among the member 
states. With community and home care being emphasized  practically  everywhere in the advanced 
industrial world, it would be another task to examine how countries handle equipment maintenance at 
home, in  doctors' offices, hospitals and nursing homes,  and who is responsible and  accountable to 
whom. 
  The exact financial burdens of the cost of  purchasing technology and their use in patient care are 
not knonw on the basis of available   data and accounting schemes. The information on the cost of 
surgical,  medical and dental equipment, machinery, instruments and supplies need to be  improved. 
There are significant differences in charges for the prescription and non-prescription medical care 
commodities 
across Europe. There are no unified accounting schemes across Europe nor unified and refined product 
classification schemes. Finally, the contribution  of health care technologies to the improvement of 
quality care and  quality of life should receive systematic comparative attention as well as the medical 
devices industry  as a labor market.  
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